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BOOK REVIEW
THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST
SPEECH IN AMERICA
By Lee C. Bollinger (Clarendon Press, 1986)
Reviewed by Judge Abner J. Mikva, United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia.
The difficulty with the First Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution is that it sets a higher standard for national behavior than most
of us are willing to observe most of the time. With the exception of abso-
lutists like the late Justice Hugo Black (who insisted that the clause
"Congress shall make no law" meant "Congress shall make no law"),
most of us waver over the parameters of first amendment strictures.
The Tolerant Society, by Professor Lee Bollinger, offers a thorough
and scholarly analysis of our ambivalence. In discussing the abortive at-
tempts of Nazis to march in Skokie, Illinois, and various landmark first
amendment cases, Bollinger forces a confrontation between our pious af-
fection for the first amendment in general and our distinct uneasiness
with its application to odious causes. See Bollinger at 13-15, 23-44,
67-70, 126-31; see also Bollinger at 15-23 (discussing Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919)); Bollinger at 31-32, 179-82 (discussing Beau-
harnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942)).
I had the personal discomfort of representing the Village of Skokie,
Illinois, as a United States Congressman during the turbulence surround-
ing the Nazi march. My conflicts were enhanced on the one hand by my
status as a Jew of World War II vintage and on the other hand by my
having served as a long-time, active member of the American Civil Liber-
ties Union and my having studied the first amendment at law school
under the late Harry Kalven, one of the certified heroes of free speech
and press.
As good scholars do, Professor Bollinger refrains from presenting
any clear-cut resolutions to my conflicts. Rather, he puts forth a clear
picture of the reasons for our national ambivalence and identifies the
weaknesses of the various competing schools of first amendment thought.
It is comforting to know that even the experts are in conflict and that the
simple explanations (Justice Black's absolutist views, Justice Holmes's
"clear and present danger" exception to freedom of speech) are indeed
simple - and unsatisfactory to the task.
What do we think about the first amendment? Most of us who are
lawyers treat it as a legal device - a limitation imposed on Congress
against passing any laws abridging "freedom of speech." We barely stop
to think of how broadly it has been interpreted. The first amendment
was the easiest to "incorporate" into the fourteenth amendment due pro-
cess clause and thereby the easiest to apply against the states; the rights
of freedom of speech and freedom of the press were the first rights that
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the Supreme Court held to be so incorporated. Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652 (1925) (speech); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (press).
Even critics of the incorporation theory generally agree that state and
local governments should be restrained from abridging freedom of
speech. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 85-86 (1947)
(Black, J., dissenting). We tarry even less at the question of what is being
protected. We may argue about what is "speech," but we seldom look at
what is "freedom" of speech. We do expect some kinds of limitations
(because it is a legal concept, and legal concepts generally abhor abso-
lutes), but we fight furiously over when, where and how those limitations
can be applied.
For the majority of Americans who are not lawyers, freedom of
speech is one of the things that separates us from communist or fascist
dictatorships. We have freedom of speech, and people living under dicta-
torships do not. Nevertheless, with the greatest of ease, we insist that
people should not be allowed to espouse philosophies of dictatorship in
our country. Many, if not most, of those who wanted to keep the Nazis
from marching in Skokie saw no tension between their own collective
attitude and the first amendment. From their perspective, what the Na-
zis wanted did not involve "free speech."
If the situation in Skokie looks like an easy free-speech problem -
and it does to many who did not live there - one should study the fac-
tual situation in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (discussed in
Bollinger at 31-32, 74, 181). In that case, an extremist wrote a leaflet
urging his fellow citizens to join his White Circle League to prevent "Ne-
groes" from "mongrelizing" the white population of America. 343 U.S.
at 252. He was convicted under an Illinois "group libel" statute, id. at
251, and the Supreme Court upheld the conviction in a five-four decision.
(I have a penchant for being around when the first amendment erupts: I
was a law clerk that year for Justice Minton, who joined in Justice
Frankfurter's majority opinion, notwithstanding my exhortations to the
contrary). Beauharnais seemed clear-cut (and wrong) to me at the time
- the defendant was convicted under a vague and silly statute. After
Skokie, I realized that the problem is not quite as clear-cut if one is on
the receiving end of hostile or inflammatory speech.
Obscenity usually is no obstacle for first amendment lawyers. We
repeat the profundity that no one was ever molested by a book and ex-
pect to carry the day. Most of the time we do. But how do we fit "kid-
die-porn" into the pattern? Why is sexually explicit material covered by
the first amendment except when it involves children? When is a child
not covered by the first amendment? Why can a sixteen-year-old buy
cigarettes but not Playboy? All of these questions destroy any notion of
symmetry in this difficult area of the law - so much so that the late and
distinguished Justice Stewart will be most remembered for his candid ad-
mission that he could not legally define obscenity, but he knew it when
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he saw it. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
As I have indicated, Professor Bollinger does not provide this miss-
ing symmetry - at least not in the sense of explaining and reconciling all
of the landmark first amendment cases or all of the different thoughts
and approaches of the first amendment experts. What he does provide is
a different rationale for having the first amendment at all. See Bollinger
ch. 4. It is a mark of our national strength that we have the first amend-
ment as part of our fundamental "social ethic."
In every other area of activity, we impose legal restraints, including
fines and imprisonment, to regulate conduct and to deter or punish anti-
societal behavior. Only in the area of speech activity do we construct a
wall insulating such activity from restraint. See id. ch. 3. John Milton
was a great poet, but after Adolf Hitler and Ayatollah Khomeini, it is
hard to continue to believe his assertion that the truth will always win
out, obviating the need for restraint. See id. at 58-59. Studying the ap-
peal of Milton's pronouncement, Professor Bollinger comments, "Speech
is either entirely innocuous or will be stopped naturally from causing
harm when confronted by the truth." Id. at 59. I believe that the expla-
nation for exalting speech must be more complicated than Milton made
it.
Neither Milton nor the variation on Milton that suggests the need
for exchange of political ideas to improve society provides a sufficient
rationale. The latter is the "political speech" notion which my colleague
Judge Robert Bork once espoused but has since rejected. That was the
rationale which allowed the Supreme Court once to hold that motion
pictures were outside the first amendment because they were only "en-
tertainment" and not "political speech." Handy as such extrapolation
might be for handling pornography and obscenity, it is a distinction with-
out a difference. One can speak through the medium of entertainment.
"Doonesbury" entertains some as a comic strip; it vexes others as much
as the editorials in the Wall Street Journal do.
My law professor Harry Kalven, whose works Professor Bollinger
discusses along with the works of Alexander Meiklejohn, id. at 146-58,
was concerned that the cases concentrated too much on the right to hear
and were subjugating the right to speak. Kalven worried about the
"heckler's veto," which measured the requisite level of restraint on free-
dom of speech by the violence of the reaction. That concern is no less
valid today. Professor Bollinger points out that the central exceptions to
freedom of speech still broadly cited by the courts - the "fighting
words" exception, libel, and obscenity - constitute attempts to catego-
rize restricted speech by its offensiveness to its audience or, in the case of
libel, its harm to one individual. See id. at 181-86. The cases testing
these exceptions are complicated and many. New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964), did not end the run of libel cases (see Gertz v. Welch,
418 U.S. 323 (1974)). Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
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(1942), did not set clear guidelines as to how courts should measure the
consequences of disturbing speech (see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969)). Professor Bollinger criticizes the "lack of social value" test
used to explain these exceptions as too simplistic. See Bollinger at 180-
85.
All the country's judges and all the country's law professors cannot
put this simple little first amendment freedom back together again into
an intelligible, consistent, coherent whole. John Hart Ely, for instance,
tried to sort the cases into those in which speech had a "communicative
impact" and those in which the impact did not have any communicative
significance. See id. at 204-12. He used this categorization to explain
how the Supreme Court could uphold a conviction for draft-card burn-
ing, United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), yet could strike down
a conviction for wearing a black armband to high school. Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Commun. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Some of us
still have trouble with that explanation.
Professor Bollinger does not think such a reconciliation is necessary.
To him the right of free speech is a way of testing the limits of our self-
restraint as hearers of offensive speech. See Bollinger at 182-183. The
greater our self-restraint - our maturity and self-confidence as a nation
- the greater will be our tolerance for extremist speech. If Chaplinsky
had been allowed to "mouth off" on further occasions, the people of New
Hampshire might have learned to tolerate such fighting words as "fas-
cist" and "racketeer." That tolerance has its limits is obvious. Professor
Bollinger recognizes this. See id. at 187. That the limits will vary from
time to time and from provocation to provocation is also obvious. Pro-
fessor Bollinger's analysis shifts the emphasis from trying to find some
solid dimensions in the first amendment to be applied automatically in
free speech cases toward an examination of the socio-political underpin-
nings of the first amendment. We are a better nation for trying to exer-
cise tolerance in the face of offensive speech - even if we do not always
succeed.
Even though it may not help me decide any hard questions arising
under the first amendment, I liked Professor Bollinger's book. He even
makes me feel better about my lack of success in dealing with the Skokie
case or in trying to influence the result in Beauharnais. In a complicated,
pluralistic, opinion-ridden society like ours, tolerance does not always
win.
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